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stacks/stx

reactive-bindings: `:html=` binding writes `innerHTML` without an escape-by-default option (Vue-style `v-html` parity)

#1708
Closed glennmichael123 opened this 23 days ago · 0 comments
23 days ago

TL;DR

The :html=\"expr\" reactive binding emits client-side code that calls el.innerHTML = <expr-result> with no sanitization. This is the framework's analogue of Vue's v-html / React's dangerouslySetInnerHTML — opt-in raw-HTML escape hatch — but unlike those frameworks, there's no documented warning, no lint rule, and no "escape by default; opt out via :html-unsafe" mode for the common case.

Today's code path in packages/stx/src/reactive-bindings.ts:237-247:

else if (attribute === 'html') {
  // html binding - update innerHTML
  code += `      (function() {
    var el = document.getElementById('${elementId}');
    if (el) {
      try {
        el.innerHTML = ${evalExpr};
      }
      catch (e) { console.error('Binding error:', e); }
    }
  })();
`
}

evalExpr is whatever the user wrote in their template (store.commentBody, post.html, …). If any of those ever hold attacker-controlled HTML — comment fields, search-result snippets, JSON from a third-party API — that markup runs in the page's origin.

Why this isn't strictly a bug today

It's an opt-in API. Developers writing :html=\"foo\" are explicitly choosing raw HTML, the same way they would with v-html. The risk is when this becomes a habit and an unrelated change starts pushing user input into the bound store, with no lint or runtime guard to catch it.

Proposed improvements

Pick any subset:

  1. Doc-level: prominent warning in the directive docs that :html= is the framework's v-html equivalent, only safe with trusted content. Currently the directive isn't documented as such.
  2. Sanitizer hook: stx already ships @stacksjs/sanitizer. Add an opt-in :html.safe=\"foo\" modifier that pipes through the sanitizer before writing. The bare :html= keeps current behavior.
  3. Strict-mode warning: when stx strict mode is on, warn on :html= usage at compile time (similar to the existing strict-mode hints for document.querySelector etc.).
  4. Build-time AST check: a pre-existing project lint rule could refuse :html=\"<storeName>.<field>\" patterns that touch untrusted store data, by inspecting the source store's declared shape.

Found during a deep-scan audit. Not a bug, but the framework's only XSS-shaped escape hatch shouldn't be undocumented and unguarded.

🤖 Filed via Claude Code

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